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1 Introduction
The notion that education is a key determinant of individual productivity has a long and distin-
guished history in economics, going back at least to the work of Mincer (1958), Houthakker (1959)
and Miller (1960). At the conceptual level one may distinguish between three dimensions of a formal
education which hold the potential to aﬀect individual productivity: The quantity of education,
the quality of education, and the subject matter studied.
While the quantity of education can be measured by years of schooling, the quality of education
is harder to account for. Still, one may attempt to gauge the impact from quality, by adding
reasonable proxies to otherwise standard wage regressions, such as test score results. Alternatively,
one may try to infer the impact from quality by including characteristics of the school attended
in earnings regressions (e.g. pupil/teacher ratios and school size). As is well known, standard
theories would predict a positive impact from both of these dimensions of education on individual
productivity (Becker, 1967), as well as on macroeconomic outcomes (e.g. Lucas, 1988). This
proposition has been tested (and debated) intensely over the years.1
The third dimension of human capital accumulation, which has received considerably less at-
tention by academic researchers, is what we focus on in the present study. The issue is whether
the particular field of study, or the contents of the curriculum, has a separate impact on individual
productivity. Existing studies, surveyed below, suggests this is the case. A typical finding is that
the labor market pay-oﬀ from pursuing an education within the humanities is substantially smaller
than that associated with most other types of education. For example, OLS estimates for Denmark,
reported below, suggests the wage rate earned by individuals with a tertiary education within the
humanities is 22% lower than that associated with other tertiary degrees.2
1See Card (1999, 2001) for a review of the literature which attempts to estimate the causal impact from an
additional year of schooling on individual wages; Card and Krueger (1996) review the literature on the impact from
school quality on labor market outcomes at the level of the individual. Bills and Klenow (2000) provide an analysis
of the education/growth nexus at the aggregate level; Hendricks (2002) examines the contribution from quality
diﬀerences in human capital in accounting for cross-country wage diﬀerences.
2We refer to the groups under consideration as having obtained a “tertiary” education. Note, however, that all
individuals in our sample below attained a master degree. Hence, the number of years of schooling for all individuals
in our sample is rather homogenous.
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These findings could suggest that some types of education provide the individual with more
productive human capital than others. At the same time, large wage premia across diﬀerent fields
of study are somewhat puzzling. If wage diﬀerentials (of considerable magnitude) appear one would
a priori expect changes in the distribution of students across fields of study; a process that would
continue (in theory) until wages are equalized.
An alternative explanation for the above mentioned findings is that existing OLS estimates are
not identifying the impact of diﬀerent types of education on wages. Instead, the results may be
attributed to a lack of control for diﬀerences in relative cognitive abilities, or, “comparative advan-
tages” in intellectual pursuits. It seems plausible that comparative intellectual advantages matter
when the individual chooses which type of education to pursue. That is, a relatively mathematically
skilled student may be more partial to an education where mathematics is used intensively, com-
pared to a gifted student with comparative advantages in verbal abilities. Moreover, some types of
ability do seem to yield a higher labor market pay-oﬀ than others. For example, Dougherty (2003)
finds that numeracy has a strong positive impact on individual wages, whereas literacy has a much
smaller (and often insignificant) impact.3 Accordingly, if relative cognitive abilities determine the
type of education, the individual pursues and aﬀects the final wage, existing return estimates to
the type of education may be biased.
The Danish educational system is well suited for studying the returns to diﬀerent types of
education. The reason is that university degrees in Denmark are highly specialized. For example, if
one chooses to study economics then this is the subject matter pursued throughout the entire time
at the university; both during the undergraduate and the graduate level. Intellectual excursions
into other fields only occur to a very modest extent, in contrast to what may be the case under
e.g. a US-type system. Consequently, examining the labor market performance of Danes holding
diﬀerent types of tertiary education is likely to convey information about the extent of human
3See also Bishop (1992) and Joensen and Nielsen (2009) who find that greater skills in mathematics goes along with
higher individual wages. Interestingly, similar results are obtained in the aggregate data. Hanushek and Woessmann
(2009) document that the link between average test scores in mathematics and science is more strongly related to
aggregate growth than test scores in reading; when all three types of test scores are included in the regression the
latter turns insignificant.
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capital production within diﬀerent fields of study. In addition, Danish universities are publicly
funded which reduces the scope for marked quality diﬀerences.
Accordingly, the present paper contributes to the literature by attempting to elicit information
about the causal eﬀect of the field of study on individual productivity, as it manifests itself in
individual wages. The data set underlying the empirical analysis covers the part of the Danish
population which completed high school during the period 1981-1990.4 Narrowing the focus to
the group of individuals which subsequently graduated from a tertiary education, and ended up in
wage-employment, we examine whether returns to education diﬀer systematically across previous
field of study.
As a first pass, we examine the relative labor market performance of individuals who chose
to study within the broad fields of human arts and other types of tertiary educations, using the
standard wage equation. Conditional on standard determinants of wages an OLS regression reveals
that individuals who pursued an education within the human arts fared much worse, as noted
above, than individuals with other majors.
Still, OLS estimates are unlikely to capture the causal eﬀect of the type of education on individ-
ual productivity, unless relative cognitive abilities are controlled for. Accordingly, we subsequently
try to control for comparative intellectual advantages by invoking individual-level information about
academic specialization in the Danish high school system. In addition, we are able to utilize in-
formation about the high school attended, high school GPA, as well as other individual control
variables. Upon including such controls in the wage equation we find a considerable reduction in
return diﬀerences. Still, a negative and significant diﬀerence persist; the wage diﬀerence between
human arts majors and others is reduced from 22% to 16%.
Ultimately it is hard to rule out that other — unobserved — factors could simultaneously impact
on the choice of education type as well as productivity. As a result we try to make additional
headway by employing an instrumental variables (IV) approach to the issue at hand.
4When we refer to the Danish high school in this paper, we mean the ordinary high school ("gymnasium"). The
Danish high school is of a three year duration.
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To identify the impact of the field of study on wages we begin by studying the educational choice
itself. That is, the choice of which type of tertiary education to pursue. Specifically, we model the
choice of field of study as a function of (relative) academic abilities, and variables thought to capture
the observed academic tastes of the individuals’ high school peer group. While the former turns
out to be linked to final wages, the latter determinants should not aﬀect the productivity of the
individual, once we carefully control for high school fixed eﬀects (perhaps reflecting variation in
teacher quality etc.), the curriculum studied by the individual in high school as well as the academic
achievements of the individual when graduating from high school. As a consequence, peer group
characteristics serve as instruments for the individuals’ choice of field of study.
As documented below, student choices are indeed interdependent. Specifically, we find that
there is a high correlation between the ultimate education choices of seniors and the ultimate
educational choice of (the two years younger) freshmen.5 Similarly, the fraction of female high
school students in the cohort greatly influences the educational choice of the individual student.
We interpret these findings as reflecting the influence from student interaction about the attrac-
tiveness of various fields of study. That is, it reflects the consequences of informational updating.
The type of information conveyed is unlikely only to be about labor market earnings; raw labor
market earnings are relatively easy to observe. However, it is considerably harder to assess the
broader “quality-of-life” pay-oﬀ to a specific education. For instance, what is the associated sta-
tus, work environment and so forth? We hypothesize that student interaction serves to convey
this kind of information. In addition, we conjecture that students with (revealed or hypothesized)
preferences for particular fields of study likely hold an informational advantage within their pre-
ferred area. Accordingly, if an individual is more exposed to a peer group with preferences for the
human arts, the more likely it will be that new information about the “quality-of-life” aspects of
a working life with a human arts degree is brought forward. This new information may aﬀect the
educational choice. Note that since the hypothesis emphasizes information updating, it does not
5As explained in Section 3, there is a good reason why the interdependence should appear between seniors and
first year students (rather than between seniors and second year students) during the period we study.
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follow that more information about, say, the humanities necessarily will increase the probability
that one would choose an education within this field of study.6
The link between the fraction of seniors with revealed preference for the humanities (judged by
their ultimate choice of education type) and the educational choices of younger students, amends
itself readily to this interpretation. The link between the fraction of females and the ultimate
educational choice of the individual is perhaps somewhat more controversial. Nevertheless, a similar
interpretation is viable. To begin with, female and male students may have a diﬀerent composition
of their abilities. In an influential study, Benhow and Stanley (1980) examined nearly 10,000
mathematically. gifted boys and girls, at the ages of 12 to 14. Their main empirical finding was a
significant sex diﬀerence in mathematical reasoning as measured by the SAT-M, in favor of the boys.
This observed diﬀerence could not be ascribed to diﬀerential course-taking accounts.7 Moreover,
20 years later Benbow et al. (2000) revisited the sample and studied the educational and career
outcomes of the students; they document a significant diﬀerence in education choices, with boys
(now around 33) more likely to have chosen an education within the natural sciences; girls were
more likely to pursue an education within the humanities. Admittedly, it seems hard to assess
whether (or the extent to which) these findings have a “genetic” or cultural origin. But either way
it would appear that women are more partial to the humanities, compared to men. Indeed, we
obtain a similar correlation in our empirical analysis below; females are themselves more likely to
enter into the humanities. Hence, if females are partial to the humanities, they may well hold more
information about the consequences of choosing this field of study. The ensuing interaction and
dissemination of information about the non-pecuniary returns to an education in the humanities
may then influence the choice of education of the individual student.
In sum, we argue that the high school specific fractions of female students, and seniors choosing
an education with the human arts, are viable instruments for the choice of which type of tertiary
education individuals pursue. With these instruments in hand, we proceed to estimate the impact
6Section 3 contains a more detailed discussion of this issue.
7See also Guiso et al. (2008) and Machin and Pekkarinen (2008) for a discussion of gender specific test scores in
math and reading.
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of choosing an education in the humanities by 2SLS.
Our 2SLS estimates diﬀer substantially from the OLS counterparts. After instrumenting we find
no diﬀerence in the impact from the education choice on wages. Hence, we are led to the following
conclusions: Relative cognitive abilities do have a substantial impact on wages, and comparative
intellectual abilities do seem to matter for the choice of which education to pursue. However, the
impact from the education per se on wages is independent of the field of study. In other words,
returns to education do not diﬀer across fields.
Naturally, one may question our identification strategy. In particular, one could argue that the
first stage correlation between the educational choices of diﬀerent high school specific groups is
simply picking up (unobserved) school quality in various dimensions. Since such quality diﬀerences
may influence productivity and wages this reasoning would suggest that our instruments are invalid.
We believe such concerns can be put to rest in the present case, for a number of reasons. First,
Danish high schools are (generally) publicly funded, from a regional source. Hence, the type of local
“neighborhood eﬀects”, known to be operative in e.g. the US, whereby high income municipalities
can provide better funding for educational facilities, are not operative in Denmark. Second, all
Danish high schools follow the same curriculum and students attend the same (centrally devised)
written exams. Third, in our analysis we are able to control for the identity of the high school the
individual have attended. That is, we include high school fixed eﬀects (149 in all). If a specific high
school happens to deliver high quality teaching in some particular field, a high school fixed eﬀect
picks it up. Finally, although we are confident in the excludability of our instruments in the second
stage, for the reasons stated above, we nevertheless test the exclusion restriction directly and find
support for this hypothesis as well.
The paper proceeds as follows. The next section provides a brief review of the related literature.
Section 3 presents a simple model illustrating our identification strategy. Section 4 describes the
econometric approach, and Section 5 describes the institutional features of the Danish educational
system as well as the data used in our empirical analysis. Section 6 presents our main results, and
section 7 provides various robustness checks. Finally, section 8 concludes.
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2 Related Literature
While the literature on the return to schooling is vast, only a relatively limited number of studies
have attempted to come to grips with the return to type of education.
James et al. (1989) is the earliest contribution (to our knowledge) which provides evidence
of diﬀerences in human capital remuneration, by field of study. Specifically, they add dummy
variables to an annual earnings equation capturing college majors. Their sample includes earnings
and various individual specific characteristics (including the college attended) of 1241 males, drawn
from the National longitudinal study of the high school class of 1972 (NLS72). They find very
large diﬀerences in the “return” to college major. For instance, a student who chose his major in
the humanities, instead of engineering, should expect 45% lower annual earnings in 1985, ceteris
paribus; a truly remarkable return diﬀerence. Indeed, as James et al. concludes (p. 251): “[...]
while sending your child to Harvard appears to be a good investment, sending him to your local
state university to major in Engineering, to take lots of math, and preferably to attain a high
GPA, is an even better investment.” On a priori grounds, however, their estimates may not reflect
a causal impact on productivity for two reasons. First, their labor market data concerns annual
earnings. As a result, some of the observed diﬀerence may be attributed to diﬀerences in number
of hours worked in diﬀerent occupations. Second, the choice of major is treated as exogenous.8
Blundell et al. (2000) draw on the UK National Child Development Survey, which contain
data on family background of children born in 1958 (between March 3 and 9), their educational
choice (including the subject studied) along with labor market data on hourly wages. The wage is
observed for the year 1991, when the subjects were 33 years old. In contrast to previous studies,
Blundell et al. (2000) also attempt to deal with the endogeneity problem by invoking matching
methods to identify the impact from higher education on hourly wages. Specifically, individuals
8Daymont and Andrisani (1984) also contain information about fields of study; but their focus is on showing that
the gender gap in wage regressions shrink, once the choice of major is accounted for. Other studies that investigates
earnings diﬀerential across majors include Dolton and Makepeace (1990), Grogger and Eide (1995) and Loury and
Garman (1995). A common feature of these studies is that they also (in contrast to the present study) treat the
choice of type of education as exogenous.
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with a higher education were compared with individuals who could have taken a degree (based on
previous educational performance) but chose not to, while sharing various observable characteristics
(like ability, family background etc.). Naturally, this only resolves the endogeneity problem if all
relevant individual specific characteristics are controlled for. If unobservable characteristics matter
for wages and choice of education the estimates remain biased.9 In line with previous studies,
Blundell et al. also detect diﬀerences in labor market rewards across fields of study. For example,
chemistry and biology exhibits the lowest return, whereas economics, accountancy and law the
highest. In many cases, however, the eﬀects from educational type is not very precisely estimated,
presumably because of a rather limited sample size.
Bratti and Mancini (2003) also examine data from the UK. Like Blundell et al. (2000) they
invoke matching methods. In addition, they also consider the problem that selection may take place
over unobservable variables. In ensuring identification they rely on a multinomial-logit-OLS (MLO)
set up, where choice of education is estimated and then the impact of education type on wages. As in
the present paper they invoke an IV methodology. In Bratti and Mancini the exclusion restriction
is that choices made in previous education (specifically: A-level curriculum) and the age of the
student does not matter for wages directly, controlling for type of degree and standard Mincer-type
controls. While their OLS results suggest that graduates from economics and business subject
did better than the rest, their MLO results lead to no clear-cut ranking of subjects; the pecking
order appears to change over time. One may argue, however, that their data are not optimal. The
reason is that the data source (University Statistical Research data) does not include information
about salaries. Since the authors do have access to fairly detailed information about occupation,
they can construct salaries for individuals. This is done by using data from the New Earnings
Survey; individuals salaries are computed as (p. 9) “the average gross weekly pay of individuals
employed full time (in the same occupation) in the year following the questioner”. Hence, by
construction there is no within-occupation variation in earnings in their sample. As a consequence,
9This approach is similar to the OLS wage regressions reported below; like the National Child Development Survey
our data contain very rich socio-economic background information of the individuals pursuing a higher education,
which we control for alongside more standard variables like work experience etc.
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their results are likely to speak to the impact from the type of education on occupations, rather
than on wages per se; potentially valuable information pertaining to diﬀerences in wages across
individuals with diﬀerent educational backgrounds in similar occupations cannot be used for the
purpose of identification.
Finally, Arcidiacono (2004) examine the return to college major, by modelling the educational
decision explicitly. Arcidiacono, like James et al. (1989), rely in the NLS72 data set, implying the
return estimates speak to earnings, rather than wages per se. The study documents that selection is
indeed taking place. Moreover, controlling for selection, he still finds considerable return diﬀerences
across majors; as in James et al. students majoring in e.g. the natural sciences fare better in the
labor market.
3 Some Theoretical Considerations
In this section we develop a simple conceptual framework which motivates our identification strat-
egy. Suppose individuals derive utility from wage income, y, and “quality of life” more broadly, q.
The latter variable is thought to capture, in a parsimonious way, factors such as status, work envi-
ronment and job satisfaction associated with being employed using education of type i = H(uman
arts), O(ther). Without loss we assume wage income is observable, whereas q is something individu-
als hold expectations about. Utility is separable in the two arguments (y, q), and the expected level
of utility for an individual (the index of whom is suppressed in the interest of brevity) is therefore
E [U (y, q)] = u (y) +
Z
v (q) f (q) dq,
where f (·) is the density function for q.10
We assume f (·) supports a given variance σ2 and mean µ; both may be specific to either
type of education:
¡
µi, σ
2
i
¢
, i = H,O. Importantly, both σ2i and µi are thought to reflect the
10See e.g. Fershtman et al. (1996) for an analysis of the allocation of talent in a society where individuals derive
utility from consumption and social status. In the present case, however, we define “q” more broadly to include other
aspects of final employment that individuals may value.
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individuals’ perception of the moments of the distribution of q. We treat both as known with
subjective certainty in the derivations below, but both may vary from one individual to the next.
In this sense we capture, in a simple way, diﬀerences in the information set of individuals at the
time of optimization. Accordingly, these are the parameters which may be influenced by student-
to-student interaction.
The felicity functions u (·) and v (·) exhibit positive and diminishing marginal utility: uy > 0,
uyy < 0, vq > 0, vqq < 0. If we Taylor approximate v around the mean, µ, we obtain:
v (q) ' v (µ) + vq (µ) (q − µ) + vqq (µ)
2
(q − µ)2 .
Evaluating expected utility we obtain, after some rearrangements, a simple representation of the
preferences, which depends on income, expected quality of life and the variance of the latter11
E [U (y, q)] ≈ u (y) + v (µ) + vqq (µ)
2
σ2.
Now, suppose an individual with these preferences are to choose between two alternative types
of education: H and O. Realistically, the individual undoubtedly will have diﬀerent aptitude
to the two types of education. That is, diﬀerent relative ability levels, which manifests itself
in diﬀerent wages. To capture this we may define the levels of income in final occupation as
yH ≡ y (αH) , and yO ≡ y (αO) .12 The parameter αi captures ability, and we expect the relative
level of ability (αH/αO) to diﬀer across individuals, reflecting variation in comparative cognitive
ability. Hence, some students may have a comparative cognitive advantage in the humanities,
implying αH > αO ⇒ yH > yO. For others, of course, it may be the other way round. The
pertinent characteristic of αi is that it is predetermined at the time of optimization; it may have
11See the Appendix for derivations.
12Of course, we could easily admit wages to be aﬀected explicitly by years of schooling etc. Say, by assuming
yi = αieρiui , where ρi is the (potentially) field-specific return to a year of (field specific) education, ui. Similarly, at
the cost of some more notation, we could allow both dimensions of ability (αH , αO) to aﬀect wages in either form of
occupation; say yi = eρiuiΠα
βi
i . In general, then, we would allow the return to these abilities to diﬀer; βH 6= βO.
Finally, we abstract from “absolute” ability. This too could be introduced, perhaps defined as an average of the two
components (αH , αO) .
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been determined earlier in life, or simply at birth.
Next, one may suppose the perceived mean and variance of q in the two potential endeavours
of life diﬀer. For simplicity, suppose only the latter diﬀers. If so the individual will prefer H to O
iﬀ
u ([y (αH)]) +
vqq (µ)
2
σ2H > u [y (αO)] +
vqq (µ)
2
σ2O.
Hence, individuals with high ability in H will be more likely to choose this type of education. How-
ever, greater uncertainty with respect to q (i.e., σ2H) may persuade the individual to do otherwise.
Accordingly, uncertainty as to the non-pecuniary consequences of the educational choice may
impact on what the individual decides, as a consequence of risk aversion. We hypothesize that
some of the uncertainty may be resolved by interacting with fellow students. In particular, if the
individual is exposed to students with information about q this will lower σ2.
Naturally, the interaction could aﬀect perceived µ as well. As a consequence of these multiple
channels of influence, the net impact on the inequality from “more information” is ambiguous.
For instance, if the result of the interaction is simply to lower σ2H (say) then interaction should
make it more likely that the individual chooses H. Alternatively, suppose the student-to-student
interaction reveal information about µ. Naturally, if the information update implies µ0H > µH (with
µ0H being the revised mean), it should also make it more likely that the individuals chooses H. But
if µ0H < µH , the converse is true.
An important point, however, is that neither µ nor σ2 matters to wages, y; they only aﬀect the
educational choice. Accordingly, factors that lead to changes in
¡
µi, σ
2
i
¢
may be useful in identifying
the impact of the educational choice itself. We hypothesize that student-to-student interaction, and
thus the characteristics of the individuals’ peer group, may serve this purpose.
Our empirical results indicate that the educational choices of students are indeed interdepen-
dent. For instance, we find that the ultimate choice of tertiary education of freshmen is influenced
by the occurrence of seniors choosing an education within the humanities. It is important to stress
that seniors and freshmen (in Denmark they are two years apart) are not paired up arbitrarily. Dur-
ing the period we study students were to choose their academic specialization in high school after
12
the first year.13 It seems plausible that high school specialization could give rise to a tendency to
academic path dependence; early specialization aﬀecting the ultimate form of specialization. Hence,
if fellow students were to have an impact on individual’s choice of ultimate tertiary education, a
major influence would be possible after one year of high school studies. It should be observed that
this empirical link is not driven by high school specific eﬀects, like teacher quality, as documented
below. It cannot be accounted for by student performance, or academic preferences as revealed by
the mode of specialization.
We also document that the frequency of female fellow students impacts the educational decision
of the individual high school student. As noted above, and documented below: In practice female
students tend to choose a human arts education more frequently than male students. Insofar as this
reflect preferences for human arts, it is plausible that female students are able to convey updated
information about qH to their fellow students.
Admittedly, our empirical analysis cannot pinpoint exactly why there appears to be interdepen-
dence in the educational choices of students. However, the simple framework above oﬀers a potential
explanation. It seems plausible that the interaction between students aﬀect σ2, and perhaps µ. As
a consequence, educational choices are influenced.
From the perspective of identification the key point is that there is little reason to expect that
the student interaction during high school influences productivity (and thus wages) directly once we
carefully control for high school fixed eﬀect, and various student specific characteristics, including
test score results. Rather, in keeping with the theory above, we hypothesize the interaction influ-
ences expectations about the non-pecuniary rewards to pursuing an education in the humanities,
and outside the humanities, which impacts on the choice of education. To be sure, we also test this
assumption; data does not allow us to reject it.
13The institutional details about the high school system during the period under examination are laid out in Section
5.2.1.
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4 Econometric Strategy
In estimating the relative return to field of study we specify a wage equation that includes the
individual’s choice of educational type. The wage earned by individual i is denoted by yi. Si
measures the education type (major in human arts or other types) chosen by individual i and is
the endogenous variable of interest. Si equals one for having a masters degree within human arts
and zero otherwise; the return estimate of human arts is therefore relative to other majors. This
indicator is used because we restrict our self to include tertiary educations of about equal duration,
and because the Danish educational system is such that one specializes in one topic only at the
university.14
Our wage regression is
log(yi) = α+ ρ · Si + xiβ + di,c + di,t + di,s + ui. (1)
The parameter ρ captures the relative return on a degree within the humanities; it is the key
parameter of interest. The vector xi consists of observed background variables to be described
below; this set includes standard controls in wage regressions. The variables di,j are fixed eﬀects
which we introduce to try to control for ability; both the absolute level and comparative advantages.
We expect these fixed eﬀects to aﬀect wages, and the choice of educational type, Si.
The fixed eﬀects are di,c for high school curriculum, which should capture the individual’s own
assessment of the costs of acquiring specific skill types. We describe this variable in greater detail
below. The variable di,t controls for time eﬀects. More precisely, this is the year of graduation from
high school. Finally, di,s is included to control for the attended high school and thereby potential
quality diﬀerences in skills formation.
Ultimately we will treat Si — the indicators for educational type — as endogenous. In order to
obtain consistent estimates for ρ we therefore employ a two-step procedure. The first step involves
14We have also attempted to examine a finer division of studies. Unfortunately, we have not be able to disentangle
the returns to education in this more disaggregated setting; our instruments prove to be weak under this setup. A
possible interpretation is that we need a description of relative abilities in more dimensions than the two dimensional
“verbal” versus “mathematical” ability division that we apply below.
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fitting the following equation for educational choice
Si = θ + ziγ + xiδ + di,c + di,t + di,s + εi, (2)
We estimate (2) as a linear probability model, and the notation for the controls are the same as
above. Hence, the only new entry is zi; determinants of educational choice which do not matter to
wages themselves. That is, our instruments for Si. From a theoretical point of view, we consider
variables which have an impact on the individual’s expectations about the value of each type of
education. Empirically, our instruments have to satisfy the two requirements that (A) they are
orthogonal to ui and (B) they are highly correlated with the choice of education type, Si.
Having estimated equation (2) we subsequently construct the fitted values from the regression,
Sˆi. The second step of our two-step approach involves estimating equation (1) with Sˆi entering
the right hand side in place of Si. As we control for all the determinants of Si, except for zi, this
provides us with 2SLS estimates for the return on schooling.15
5 Data
The data we use in our empirical analysis is a data set covering the Danish population of individuals
graduating from Danish high schools during the period 1981-1990. The data are administered and
maintained by Statistics Denmark that has gathered the data from three administrative registers:
the Integrated Database for Labor Market Research (IDA), the Danish Income Registry and the
Danish Student Registry.
For each individual, we have complete data on educational and labor market histories along
with detailed information on other socioeconomic characteristics. The educational data comprise
15We would prefer to use a set of dummy variables that allows for high school quality to vary over graduation years
and high school branches, i.e., di,c×t×s. This is, however, not possible since γ is not identified as there is one dummy
variable per observation of the instumental variables as these are measured for clusters of students at the high school
level for diﬀerent graduation years and high school branches. Alternatively, dummy variables based on the interaction
between specific high schools and graduation years, i.e., di,t×s, would control for time varying high school quality.
The number of dummies under this specification — equal to 1,306 dummy variables — represents around 60 percent of
the number of clusters in the empirical analysis, again resulting in collinearity problems.
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detailed codes for the type of education attended (level, subject, and educational institution) and
the year for completing the education. The labor market data contain the hourly wages; measured
as the annual labor income divided by total hours worked.
5.1 Sampling of Data
In this study we focus on individuals that satisfy the following three criteria: (i) graduated from
high school between 1981 and 1990, (ii) proceeded to obtain a masters degree, and (iii) was wage-
employed in all years over the period 1999-2003; in the regressions below we use the average wage
over these five years as dependent variable.
We confine attention to high school graduates from the period 1981-1990 since this period was
characterized by a particularly useful institutional setting, which allows us to proxy comparative
intellectual abilities. After 1990 the high school system changes. We describe the nature of the
institutional setting in some detail below.
Using 1999 as the “first year” is a choice made for practical reasons. The last high school cohort
in our sample graduated in 1990. In Denmark it is not uncommon for students to take a sabbatical
before beginning their university studies. Moreover, few students manage to complete their studies
within a 5 year window that is the planned course of study. Hence, in order to include all cohorts
in the sample 1999 is a reasonable starting point. However, the exact choice of “initial year” is in
the end not crucial, as demonstrated in Section 7.
We average over the five year period to even out potential yearly fluctuations in wages. After
all, the null is that the choice of education matters to permanent income; averaging should increase
the signal-to-noise in the dependent variable. Still, in Section 7 we demonstrate that using time
averages is not critical to the results.
While our main regressions concern all wage earners (including public employees), we show in
Section 7 that confining attention to private employees only does not change the results appreciably.
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5.2 Explanatory Variables
5.2.1 High School Information
Figure 1 show graphically how a student would proceed through the Danish educational system,
from lower secondary school to tertiary education, during the period 1981-1990. Individuals usually
enter the Danish high school immediately after completing lower secondary school, and graduates
after three years.
When applying to a high school for admission, the student was required to specify an over-all
track to follow: “mathematical” or “language”. After completing the first year, students then self-
selected into various “branches” available for each track, as illustrated in Figure 1. Under the math
track students could choose between math/physics, math/natural sciences, math/social sciences,
or math/music, while under the languages track students could choose between languages/social
sciences, languages/music, modern languages, or classical languages.16 Hence, individuals were
grouped into eight distinct branches. During this institutional arrangement the curriculum was
determined after strictly defined course packages, implying that knowing the track and branch
provide fairly precise information about the curriculum the students completed.
<Figure1 around here>
The information about which branch the individual pursued in high school appear in (1) and
(2) as the curriculum fixed eﬀect (i.e., di,c) to control for relative cognitive abilities directly. Hence,
the basic ideas is that the choice of “branch” provides information about the individual students’
relative abilities; a math/social science major was likely not quite as mathematically inclined as
a math-physics student; at least the level of math taught was objectively speaking higher in the
math-physics branch compared to the math-social science branch.
The “branch based system” was in place until 1990; from 1991 onwards students were given
much greater autonomy with regards to course packages. Hence, the reason why we only sample
16 In the last years of the sample a few experimental branches was allowed at some high schools; e.g., Math-English
and Math-Chemistry. Only very few students pursued these branches; they are excluded from our sample.
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high school graduates up until 1990 is precisely because it marks the end of the branch based
system.
Eventually we do not have to rely on being able to fully control for relative ability, since we pur-
sue an IV approach. However, as will be seen: branch choices hold considerable explanatory power
vis-a-vis post university wages, suggesting that relative abilities across subjects indeed matter.
In order to control for “absolute ability”, we use the high school GPA, which enters into xi.
The GPA is a weighted average of the grades at the final exam at each course. The quality of the
courses as well as the GPA is comparable across high schools since all students within the same
cohort face identical written exams; all exams and major written assignments are evaluated by the
student’s own teacher as well as external examiners; high school teachers from other high schools.
The external examiners are assigned by the Danish Ministry of Education.
Completed high school is a general admission requirement for tertiary educations, as suggested
by Figure 1. We have information on which of the 149 high schools individuals attended. This
information enters as the high school fixed eﬀect, (i.e., di,s) and serve as controls for high school
quality. Moreover, we have information on year of graduation from high school, which enters as the
graduation year fixed eﬀect, i.e., di,t. This dummy captures information on experience in equation
(1).
5.2.2 Tertiary Education
As mentioned above, we focus exclusively on individuals who ultimately obtain a master’s degree.
The reason is that we want to avoid any selection bias in our results due to the choice of education
length. Moreover, we partition the type of tertiary education into two bins: human arts vs “others”.
This information enters in the regressions as individual choice of education type, i.e., in Si.
5.2.3 Other Explanatory Variables
We apply detailed individual information not related to high school attendance as explanatory
variables, i.e., variables that enter in xi. These are gender and parental education. Gender is
included to control for the gender wage gap in (1), whereas it enters (2) to control for gender
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diﬀerences in relative abilities or preferences (more on this below). Parental education is controlled
for by including a set of indicators for each parent regarding both the length and type of their
education.
Table 1 displays selective descriptive statistics for the samples. The sampling unit is the in-
dividual, and the table presents the distribution on type of tertiary education, the distribution of
students on high school branches, their high school grade point average, and their gender.
<Table 1 around here>
Some aspects of the data are worth remarking on. Almost 85% chose the math track in high
school, while only 15% chose the language track; the largest high school branch is math/physics.
Recall, these statistics are all conditional on progressing to a tertiary education and being wage
employed for an unbroken period of 5 years. As regards subsequent choice of education type, social
sciences attract the most students, whereas human arts the least. Moreover, slightly more than
60% consist of men. The high school GPA is 8.8, which is above average as expected.17
5.3 Instruments
Our identification strategy is based on the idea that co-students influence the information set on
which the individual base his or her final choice of a tertiary education. We do not doubt that
individuals own abilities and interest are central. However, it would seem plausible that fellow
students influence the individuals’ choice of education. This influence can take many subtle forms,
including providing students with a sense of what a certain type of education implies in terms
of job satisfaction given the individuals ability and interest. Such information could aﬀect the
individual’s expectations about the consequences of obtaining an education. More concretely, we
apply two instruments.
17A numerical grading system is used in Denmark. The possible grades were at the time: 0, 3, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11
and 13; 6 were the lowest passing grade, and 8 was given for the average performance.
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Our main instrument is a measure of older student’s educational choice at the high-school. The
instrument is constructed as follows: First, the shares of individuals with tertiary education are
constructed for education types; the shares are determined for the group of individuals within the
same high school and high school track. Second, the shares are lagged two years, to capture the
influence from seniors on freshmen. As explained in Section 3, we lag the variable by two years
because when a cohort graduates from high school freshman students have to choose the branch
they want to follow within the track they decided on before entry (see Figure 1). If the education
choice of older students are to have an impact on younger students it is exactly between graduating
students and freshmen students choosing branch.
Our alternative instrument exploits what appears to be a sex bias in educational attainment;
men and women appear to have diﬀerent academic tastes, which in turn may be related to diﬀerent
aptitudes towards mathematical reasoning (Benbow and Stanley, 1980, and Guiso et al., 2008).
It may also be a consequence of culture, albeit Benbow and Stanley are unable to explain the
diﬀerence in test scores based on course choices, which conceivably would be aﬀected by culture as
well.18 Moreover, even focusing on mathematically. gifted men and women, females tend to favour
an education within human arts (Benbow et al., 2000). We document a similar “bias” below, in
our sample of Danish students.
Whatever is the source of this diﬀerence among the sexes it might well matter to the educational
choices of the individual. A greater occurrence of women in the high school will, ceteris paribus,
imply a greater scope for interaction with individuals with relatively strong preferences for, and thus
presumably also more knowledge about, the humanities. As a consequence the expectations about
future (non-pecuniary) rewards to jobs oﬀered in this dimension may be aﬀected, and therefore
the educational choice itself. Specifically, the instrument is the share of women instrument is
constructed as the share of women in the same high school track as the individual.
18Guiso et al. (2008) show that the gender “gab” in math test scores, which generally favors men, tend to recede
as societies develop greater over-all equity between the sexes; this suggests an important cultural dimension to the
math test score gap. However, the reading gap, which favors women, does not disappear with gender equality. Hence,
relative diﬀerences in math/reading across sexes appear to be a robust feature across countries.
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Table 1 also displays mean and standard deviations for the instruments. The moments are
determined for the 2,171 clusters in the dataset, i.e., the instruments are determined after high
school attended, high school track, and graduation year. The measures are normalized by the
national value of the instruments, i.e., the instruments are measured as the deviation from the
national value. This measure captures the notion that, e.g., an “unusually” large share of the cohort
two years earlier entering into a particular type of education will provide prospect students with
better information to make the educational choice. The mean of both instruments is close to zero
reflecting that the high schools of students that eventually ventured on to take a tertiary education
are not “special” in this sense. At the same time one may observe that there is considerable
variation in the shares. It is this variation we will draw on in order to obtain identification.
6 Main Results
We begin the presentation of our results by focusing on wage diﬀerences between the two educational
choices. Subsequently, the results for the determinants of educational choice are discussed and
finally the results for the returns to education types are reported.
6.1 Wage diﬀerences
In Table 2, we report the results from the standard wage regression. That is, the endogeneity
problem is ignored.
<Table2 around here>
To recapitulate: These regressions are performed for persons with a tertiary education, who are
wage-employed in all years over the period 1999-2003. In the first model (raw log wage diﬀerences),
only indicators of the choice of education type are included in order to study raw log wage diﬀerences
between education types. The “raw” wage gaps (column 1) reveal that human arts graduates have
22% lower wages than other graduates (1-exp[-0.2452]).
In Models 2-5, more information is introduced into the log wage regression to study how the
estimated wage diﬀerence changes. In Model 2 we introduce a gender dummy in the regression that
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enters negatively and significantly with a parameter corresponding to women earning an average
wage that is 14% lower than the average wage for men. In Model 3 we introduce high school GPA
and find that the average wage increases by around 2.5% per grade point. Model 4 introduces
curriculum fixed eﬀect or the choice of high school branch that proxies for relative talent. It is
evident that those who studied at the math-physics branch in high school earned the highest wages
compared to any other branch. A high school curriculum in classical languages or language music
led to the lowest wages that on average were 11% lower that math-physics. In general, those who
chose the language track tend to earn lower wages than those that chose the math track. This
suggests that mathematical abilities are valued more in the labor market than linguistic abilities.
The final Model 5 includes all above mentioned explanatory variables. In addition we also include
dummies for graduation year from high school, information for education length and type of parents,
as well as high school fixed eﬀects. High school fixed eﬀects come in addition to, for example, the
eﬀect of parental education, but may comprise, e.g., teacher quality etc.
Over-all, when control variables are progressively added we observe that the relative diﬀerence
in returns across fields of study shrinks from -22% to -16%, but remains statistically (as well as
economically) significant.
6.2 Educational choice
The results for the linear probability model of the choice of education type are presented in Table
3a, that reports coeﬃcients and their associated standard errors.
<Table3a around here>
The variables of particular interest are those from which we obtain identification; the two sets of
instrumental variables, as described above. The first instrument, recall, is the fraction of students
choosing human arts out of the total number of students that complete a tertiary education within
the students’ high school and track. This instrument is lagged two years, as discussed in Section
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5.3. The second instrument is the fraction of female students out of the total number of high-school
students in the high-school track.
What we have in mind when using the instruments is that fellow students influence the indi-
viduals’ choice of education type through a better information set. More specifically, we imagine
that individuals are better informed about the education choice of human arts for high values of
the two fractions that are used as instruments. More information can either increase or decrease
the probability of choosing human arts. In other words, we expect that the instruments would
influence the probability in the same direction within each high school track. Consequently, we
allow for diﬀerent eﬀects for individuals that have followed the language track and the math track,
respectively, to get a more flexible formulation of the instruments impact on the probability of
choosing human arts.
Generally, the instruments do a good job in explaining the choice of education type judged from
their significance. In Model 6, which is based on the first instrument only, it is seen that a larger
fraction of older students choosing human arts increases the probability with a point estimate of
0.23 in the language track and reduces the probability by 0.10 in the math track.
In Model 7, we include the alternative instrument in addition to the first instrument. It is
evident that a better informed student in the language track has a higher likelihood of choosing
human arts, whereas a better informed student in the math track has a lower likelihood. That is,
the point estimates for the instruments are positive for students in the language track and negative
for students in the math track. These results are consistent with our expectations regarding better
informed students.
Notice that we also include the fraction of high school students choosing human arts lagged
one year only. Here the results are much weaker; economically and statistically. Indeed, in the
context of the language track the fraction of high school students choosing human arts lagged one
year is insignificant; for the math track it is just significant at the 5% level. These results are
consistent with the notion that a major influence on high school students future education choice
occurs around the time when the individuals were choosing their high school branch.
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This leaves us with Model 8, which includes instruments that are significant at the 1 percent level
only. The first instrument enters for both high-school tracks, whereas the alternative instrument of
female students out of the total number of high-school students only enters in the math track. It
is also interesting to observe that the alternative instrument is insignificant in the language track.
One possible explanation is that female students are highly concentrated in this track — with an
average share of about 80 percent — implying that additional female students do not reveal much
new information about working environment for human arts majors. As a result, the alternative
instrument enters insignificantly in explaining the educational choice.
The F-test of excluded instruments is a test for weak instruments. The results presented in Table
3a are estimated using clustering that allows for dependence in residuals within clusters. There are
2,171 clusters in the dataset divided after high-school attended, high-school track and graduation
year. Unfortunately, there exist no critical test value for weak instruments under clustering. The
usual F-test is the Cragg-Donald F-statistic with critical values that follow Stock et al. (2002)
and Stock and Yogo (2005) which both require independent residuals. In the absence of critical
F-values, we apply the rule of thumb that instruments are strong if the first-stage F is larger than
ten (see Staiger and Stock, 1997). It is evident that the F-tests in Models 6 and 8 exceed this value
and we consider the instruments to be strong.
Concerning the proxy for relative ability, as measured by curriculum fixed eﬀects, we find that
math-physics high school students (students who tend to obtain high wages post graduate — see
Table 2) have the lowest probability for studying human arts. All other high school branches give
a significantly higher probability. It is much more likely that the education choice is human arts,
when the high school branch is within the language track.
Besides instrument variables, and the proxies for relative ability, a number of the other variables
are worth commenting on. Being a woman increases the probability of choosing human arts by
2.5%. This result is consistent with Benhow et al. (2000) who find a sex diﬀerences in educational
choices between sexes, conditional on cognitive abilities. Moreover, a higher GPA, which we use as
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a proxy for absolute ability, reduces the probability of choosing human arts.19
6.3 Returns to Education
Next, we turn to the second stage regression of the 2SLS estimation. The results are presented in
Table 3b
<Table 3b around here>
We report the coeﬃcients from the OLS regression of Table 2, Model 5 for comparison. Models
6-8 present the 2nd stage regressions corresponding to the 1st stage regressions presented in Table
3a above. The results are striking. After instrumenting the education choice, the pronounced wage
diﬀerences reported in Table 2 disappear. The human arts dummy now enters with a slightly positive
sign. More importantly, the estimate is now economically as well as statistically insignificant. In
Model 6, the point estimate is 0.0005, whereas the point estimate is 0.0170 in Model 8. These
results are dramatically diﬀerent from the (statistically significant) OLS estimate (= -0.18). Hence,
the 2SLS approach suggests that the returns to human arts and other tertiary education types are
of similar magnitudes.20
We present the Hansen J test for overidentification, where the null-hypothesis is whether the
instruments can be excluded from the second stage of the 2SLS regression. The p-values in Models
6-8 are all above 10%, implying that we cannot reject the exclusion restriction.
We also report endogeneity tests; the null is that the endogenous regressor can be treated as
exogenous. The null-hypothesis is rejected at the 10% level for Model 6 and at the 5% level for
Models 7 and 8. In other words, we conclude that the choice of education type is indeed endogenous.
Finally, we report the Anderson-Rubin F-test for the joint test of whether the endogenous
19 In principle, high school GPA should enter the regression in a more flexible formulation to capture the impact
of ability on educational choice and wages in a flexible way and to allow for nonlinear eﬀects of GPA on education
choice due to diﬀerent admission requirements. However, when using more flexible formulations, e.g., a second or
third order polynomial, the extra terms enter insignificantly.
20We have also estimated Model 8 using a number of alternative estimation techniques. The alternative estimation
techniques are: the GMM IV using one moment restrictions, the LIML IV estimator, the IV Fuller estimator and the
bias corrected 2SLS. These estimators produce similar results, namely that the coeﬃcient on the relative returns to
human arts studies virtually equal zero with point estimates around 0.02.
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regressor is insignificant in the structural equation and that the overidentifying restrictions are
valid. These tests suggest that we cannot reject the null-hypothesis for any model.
As a result, we are led to the conclusion that the relative wage pattern observed in the (raw)
data is largely caused by selection into education types based on observed and especially unobserved
variables. The fact that human arts majors earn wages much lower than the average academic
employee is not caused by their field of study but rather the composition of their ability endowments
and the returns to these endowments in the labor market. Simply put, human arts majors are
particularly negatively selected in terms of the market values of their ability endowments.
7 Robustness
In this section we investigate the robustness of the main result of insignificant diﬀerences in the
return to education across tertiary education types. Robustness is tested in two dimensions: Using
private employees only and using alternative time span for calculating the average wage used in
the structural regression.
7.1 Private Employees
We perform the OLS and 2SLS regressions for private employees being in the sample for all years
during the period 1999-2003. The main result presented above in Table 3a and b is robust to this
change. This is evident from Table 4, where the OLS estimate of the wage diﬀerence between
human arts majors and other majors points to a large diﬀerence of almost 20%, whereas the 2SLS
regressions in Models 6-8 suggest that there is no significant diﬀerence in returns to education.
Actually, the point estimates in Models 6-8 suggest that human arts majors earn a higher return
that other majors with a positive point estimate of around 5% that, however, is insignificant. Again
the tests for overidentified restrictions, endogeneity of the educational choice, and weak instrument
robust inference all point to sound specifications for our preferred Model 8. Hence, the 2SLS
regressions result in statistically insignificant diﬀerences in the return to education type for the
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subsample of private employees.
<Table 4 around here>
7.2 Average Wages
We also investigate the robustness of the results to changes in the time span for calculating the
average wage rate. As argued in Section 5.1 above, we apply average wages of individuals to reduce
the transitory element in the wage income. In Table 5 we present Model 8 estimated on the sample
of individuals that are wage employees in all years over the period starting in 1999 and ending at
alternative years, e.g., from 1999 to 2000. We carry out this robustness check for all end years in
1999-2003 such that average wages are calculated over a 5 year period - the baseline estimation of
Table 3 -, 4 years and so on all the way to 1 year.
<Table5 around here>
As is clear from the table, the point estimate of interest is quite insensitive to change in the
average wage. This is the case for both OLS and 2SLS estimates, suggesting that the restriction
that individuals are in the sample as wage-employees in all years over the period 1999-2003 is not
paramount.
To investigate this issue further, we estimate the wage diﬀerence using OLS and the returns to
education using 2SLS for Model 8 using single year wages for all years over the period 1996-2003.
The results are depicted in Figure 2. In the upper part of the figure, the point estimates using
OLS and 2SLS are presented. Whereas the OLS point estimates are statistically and economically
significant (and negative) the 2SLS point estimates are around zero until 2000 after which the
estimates drop to -0.10. Hence, the results reported in the last section are valid for each year over
the period 1996-2000.
<Figure2 around here>
For 2001-03, the main result can no longer be established. The reason is that statistical signif-
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icance of the instruments becomes weaker as time goes by, which can be seen in the lower graph
of Figure 2. Here, the p-value of the t-statistic on the main instrument in the math track (senior’s
impact on freshmen) is displayed. The instrument becomes insignificant from 2001 and forward.
In other words, we are left with weak instruments.
This result can be understood from the development in the distribution of the number of years
between high-school and university graduation for the wage-workers in the sample. In 1996, around
20,000 wage-workers enter the analysis, increasing to 31,000 in 2001. The share of wage-workers
graduating from university at least ten years after high-school graduation has increased considerable
over this period. In 1996, the 85% percentile had ten years between graduation from high-school
and university; in 2001 this was the case for the 73% percentile. Moreover, 40% of the wage-
workers entering into the sample between 1996 and 2001 graduated from university ten years or
later after completion of high-school. This means that the distribution of the number of years
between high-school and university graduation becomes more and more right-skewed as time goes
by. Therefore, it seems plausible that factors outside high-school become relatively more important
for the educational choice; factors that we do not measure in our data and as a consequence the
instruments end up weak for the later years.
Support for the above explanation is provided when the parameters for 2001-03 are estimated
using samples of individuals that were wage-workers in 1999 - our base year - as well as the specific
year under investigation. Under this restriction, the main result is re-established after 2000, i.e., the
instruments enter as strong instruments in the linear probability model for the choice of education
and there is no significant diﬀerence in the returns to education across fields of study.
8 Conclusion
In this paper we have essentially examined the eﬃciency of human capital production across diﬀerent
types of education by exploiting Danish register data. If some fields of study are more eﬃcient in
producing human capital, this should manifest itself in a superior labor market performance of
its graduates. Baseline OLS regressions reveal that students of human arts fare the worst in the
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Danish labor market with an hourly wage rate around 20% below that of graduates within other
majors.
One may suspect, however, that the partial correlation between the type of education and
wages does not convey accurate information about human capital production. If the selection into
educational types is nonrandom the OLS estimates will be biased. Our analysis confirms that
selection seems to be at work. Socioeconomic circumstances, ability, as well as relative cognitive
abilities, measured by high school course work, influence the choice of education type.
Consequently, we invoke instruments for education type to address the selection problem. Our
two instruments are based on the influence from other students on individuals’ choice of education
type. Strikingly, once education type is instrumented, we find no diﬀerence in the return across
fields of study. This result suggests that there is no type of education, which provides the individual
with more productive human capital than others. Accordingly, the relatively poor performance of
human arts majors in the Danish labor market is due to selection according to relative cognitive
ability, rather than to low human capital production at universities.
The present analysis raises new questions worth exploring in future research. First, wage dif-
ferences seem to be related to relative cognitive abilities; mathematics appear to be important, for
example. But why is that? Is it because such abilities are relatively scarce in the population or
because they are particularly productive? If the latter is the case, then it would be useful to try
and discern why such abilities are in high demand. Further motivation for pursuing this question
is found at the macro level where test scores in math and natural sciences seem to be a stronger
linear predictor of aggregate growth than test scores for reading (Hanushek and Woessmann, 2009).
Second, how are relative abilities formed? As relative abilities determine education choices as
well as wages, it would be useful to know whether these cognitive traits have a genetic origin, or
are acquired during primary and secondary schooling. If the former is the case, education policies
cannot be invoked to influence them; and conversely if relative talents are acquired.
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A Deriving Expected Utility
The second order Taylor approximation
v (q) ≈ v (µ) + vq (µ) (q − µ) +
vqq (µ)
2
(q − µ)2
Observe that (q − µ)2 = q2 + µ2 − 2qµ. Hence
v (q) ' v (µ) + vq (µ) (q − µ) + vqq (µ)
2
q2 +
vqq (µ)
2
µ2 − µqvqq (µ)
Inserted into the utility function we obtain
E [U (y, q)] ≈ u (y) + v (µ) + vq (µ)
Z
qf (q) dq − µvq (µ)
+
vqq (µ)
2
Z
q2f (q) dq +
vqq (µ)
2
µ2 − µvqq (µ)
Z
qf (q) dq.
A useful result regarding means and variances is that
R
q2f (q) dq = µ2 + σ2. Using it in the
expression above we get
E [U (y, q)] ≈ u (y) + v (µ) + vqq (µ)
2
σ2
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Figure 1: A sketch of the Danish High School System during the period 1981-90.
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Figure 2: OLS and 2SLS log wage regressions, yearly wage rates
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and Model 8 for 2SLS. Explanatory variable is log to the yearly wage rate, i.e., 
log(yi,t) for t belonging to the period 1996‐2003. Lower graph: information on 
other instruments than the "Math*Fraction of students 2 cohorts ago choosing 
human arts" is suppressed because p‐values are <0.00001.
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics for Individuals in Private and Public Employment (1999-2003) 
  Mean Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum
     
log (wage rate) 5.620 .320 4.625 8.235
  
Subsequent education type  
Human arts share .083  
Other educational types .917  
  
High school branch  
Math-Music .054  
Math-Physics .438  
Math-Natural Sciences .199  
Math-Social Sciences .161  
Modern Languages .064  
Classical Languages .004  
Language-Social Sciences .070  
Language-Music .010  
  
High school GPA 8.813 .842 6 11.9
Women .383  
  
# individuals 20,716  
# high schools 149  
# high school graduation years 10  
  
 INSTRUMENTS Mean Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum
  
Fraction of students in human arts (language track, 2 cohorts ago) .001 .122 -.470 .630
Fraction of students in human arts (math track, 2 cohorts ago) .001 .048 -.091 .506
Fraction of women in language track .092 .122 -.218 .411
Fraction of women in math track -.078 .087 -.450 .248
  
# clusters 2,172  
 
 
Table 2: OLS log wage regressions, private sector employees only, no instruments, Average  wages 1999-2003       
 Raw log wage gap Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
  Coeff. Std. Err. Coeff. Std. Err. Coeff. Std. Err. Coeff. Std. Err. Coeff. Std. Err. 
Human arts -.2452 .0071 -.2120 .0069 -.2122 .0069 -.1933 .0074 -.1801 .0071 
           
Woman   -.1546 .0039 -.1578 .0039 -.1367 .0040 -.1365 .0039 
           
High school grade     .0250 .0022 .0342 .0022 
           
Highschool branch (Math-Physics - reference)       -.1004 .0086 -.0394 .0091 
Math-Music        -.0770 .0052 -.0764 .0051 
Math-Natural Sciences       -.0484 .0055 -.0245 .0054 
Math-Social Sciences       -.0435 .0084 -.0716 .0083 
Modern Language       -.1232 .0315 -.1519 .0309 
Classical Language       -.0858 .0078 -.0807 .0077 
Language-Social Sciences       -.1200 .0191 -.1209 .0188 
Language-Music         
         
Graduation year dummies NO NO  NO NO YES  
Parental education NO NO  NO NO YES  
High school fixed effects NO  NO   NO  NO  YES   
R-squared 0.0544  0.1207  0.1259  0.1362  0.2087   
# observations 20,716  20,716  20,716  20,716  20,716  
Note: All regressions include graduation year dummies, parental education and high school fixed effects Bold = significant at 1% level; italics  
= significant at 5% level. 
Table 3a: Linear Probability Model of Choice of Tertiary Educational Type, Human Arts versus Other (Public and Private Employees in 1999-2003) 
 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 
  Effect Std. Err. Effect 
Std. 
Err. Effect Std. Err. 
Woman .0252 .0041 .0259 .0041 .0261 .0041
High school grade -.0076 .0021 -.0075 .0021 -.0075 .0021
       
Highschool branch (Math-Physics - reference)       
Math-Music .0539 .0100 .0529 .0101 .0534 .0100
Math-Natural Sciences .0124 .0039 .0124 .0039 .0122 .0039
Math-Social Sciences .0454 .0050 .0454 .0050 .0453 .0050
Modern Languages .3311 .0140 .3344 .0301 .3474 .0148
Classical Languages .4701 .0597 .4713 .0668 .4866 .0596
Language-Social Sciences .1933 .0114 .1949 .0303 .2089 .0121
Language-Music .4565 .0316 .4581 .0411 .4726 .0318
       
Instruments by high school track       
Language*Fraction of students 2 cohort ago choosing human arts .2291 .0442 .2131 .0448 .2222 .0442
Language*Fraction of students one cohorts ago choosing human arts .0312 .0483
Language*Fraction of women in track .0601 .1181
 
Math*Fraction of students 2 cohorts ago choosing human arts -.0969 .0324 -.0945 .0331 -.0900 .0325
Math*Fraction of students one cohorts ago choosing human arts -.0846 .0351
Math*Fraction of women in track -.1173 .0307 -.1198 .0306
 
Clusters 2,172 2,172 2,172
Cluster-robust F-test 18.36 9.38 17.44
 
Observations 20,716 20,716 20,716
Note: All regressions include graduation year dummies, parental education and high school fixed effects Bold = significant at 1% level; italics  
= significant at 5% level. 
 
Table 3b: OLS and 2SLS log wage regressions private and public sector employees, average wages 1999-2003 
 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 
  Coeff. Std. Err. Coeff. Std. Err. Coeff. Std. Err. Coeff. Std. Err. 
Human arts -.1801 .0071 .0005 .1034 .0262 .0963 .0170 .0989 
       
Woman -.1365 .0039 -.1410 .0046 -.1417 .0045 -.1415 .0046 
High school grade .0342 .0022 .0357 .0025 .0359 .0025 .0358 .0025 
     
Highschool branch       
Math-Music  -.0394 .0091 -.0492 .0105 -.0506 .0103 -.0501 .0104 
Math-Natural Sciences -.0764 .0051 -.0786 .0054 -.0789 .0054 -.0788 .0054 
Math-Social Sciences -.0245 .0054 -.0327 .0074 -.0339 .0072 -.0335 .0072 
Modern Language -.0716 .0083 -.1316 .0356 -.1401 .0334 -.1370 .0343 
Classical Language -.1519 .0309 -.2382 .0545 -.2505 .0520 -.2461 .0530 
Language-Social Sciences -.0807 .0077 -.1154 .0215 -.1204 .0204 -.1186 .0209 
Language-Music -.1209 .0188 -.2053 .0509 -.2179 .0478 -.2130 .0490 
 Test val P-value Test val P-value Test val P-value 
Endogeneity test 3.136 0.0766 5.494 0.0267 3.984 0.0459 
Hansen J test 0.183 0.6686 1.322 0.9326 0.347 0.8409 
Anderson-Rubin F-test 0.09 0.9132 0.23 0.9654 0.12 0.9468 
# observations 20,716 20,716  20,716  20,716  
Note: All regressions include graduation year dummies, parental education and high school fixed effects Bold = significant at 1% level; italics  
= significant at 5% level. 
Table 4: OLS and 2SLS log wage regressions private sector employees (average wages 1999-2003) 
 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 
  Coeff. Std. Err. Coeff. Std. Err. Coeff. Std. Err. Coeff. Std. Err.
Human arts -.1956 .0111 .0368 .1635 .0532 .1422 .0597 .1494
  
Instruments   
Language*Fraction of students 2 cohort ago choosing human arts .2785 .0702 .2465 .0727 .2697 .0699
Language*Fraction of students one cohorts ago choosing human arts  .0621 .0735
Language*Fraction of women in track  .1599 .1787
  
Math*Fraction of students 2 cohorts ago choosing human arts -.0311 .0352 -.0264 .0356
Math*Fraction of students one cohorts ago choosing human arts  -.0668 .0383
Math*Fraction of women in track  -.1333 .0353 -.1405 .0357
  
Clusters 1942 1942 1942
Cluster-robust F-test  8.44 6.29 16.45
 Test val P-value Test val P-value Test val P-value
Endogeneity test 2.109 0.1464 3.356 0.0670 3.192 0.0740
Hansen J test 0.095 0.7585 1.506 0.9124 0.089 0.7657
Anderson-Rubin F-test 0.07 0.9313 0.28 0.9460 0.13 0.8754
# observations 12,304 12,304  12,304  12,304  
Note: All regressions include graduation year dummies, parental education and high school fixed effects. Bold = significant at 1% level; italics = significant at 5% level. 
Table 5: OLS and 2SLS log wage regressions private and public sector employees, average wages (Model 8) 
 1999-2003 1999-2002 1999-2001 1999-2000 1999  
  Coeff. S. E. Coeff. S. E. Coeff. S. E. Coeff. S. E. Coeff. S. E. 
Human arts – OLS -.1806 .0071 -.1807 .0069 -.1844 .0065 -.1778 .0062 -.1686 .0060
                       2SLS .0170 .0989 -.0126 .1008 .0039 .0902 .0136 .0861 .0059 .0851
   
Clusters 2,172 2,188 2,200  2,213 2,229
Cluster-robust F-test  17.44 16.57 15.52  17.81 17.82
 Test val P-val Test val P-val Test val P-val Test val P-val Test val P-val
Endogeneity test 3.984 0.046 2.63 0.105 4.551 0.033 5.153 0.023 4.223 0.0399
Hansen J test 0.347 0.841 1.04 0.606 3.086 0.379 1.282 0.734 5.354 0.1477
Anderson-Rubin F-test 0.12 0.947 0.34 0.794 0.77 0.543 0.33 0.859 1.35 0.2495
       
Human arts share .0826 .0842 .0906  .0930 .0976
Women Share .3827 .3830  .3878  .3962  .4056   
       
# observations 20,716 21,876  23,477  25,520  28,026   
Note: All regressions include graduation year dummies, parental education and high school fixed effects. Bold = significant at 1% level; italics = significant at 5% level. 
